Middle Power Diplomacy: Game Changers in International Affairs?
Notes for panel presentation to Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), Conference on Indonesian Foreign Policy (CIFP), Jakarta, 30 November 2024
There is no standard definition or agreed international list of ‘middle powers’. All of us on this platform come from countries – Indonesia, Mexico and Australia – that would be generally so regarded, but what is it that makes us, and countries like us, distinctive? What is it that distinguishes us from, at one end of the spectrum, great powers like the US and China, and – although the boundaries here are fuzzier – from what might be described as major powers (like Russia, India and Japan)? And from, at the other end of the spectrum, small powers?
You don’t get very far in defining middle powers by focusing on objective measures of physical size – size of population, GDP, landmass, defence expenditure or anything else: Norway, and in our own region Singapore, would be on just about everyone’s middle power list, but are both close to 120th in the world on population size, and each 50 times smaller than Indonesia.
I think there are three things that matter – what middle powers are not, what we are, and the mindset we bring to our international role. ‘Middle powers’ are those states which are not economically or militarily big or strong enough to really impose their policy preferences on anyone else, either globally or (for the most part) regionally. We are nonetheless states which are sufficiently capable in terms of our diplomatic resources, sufficiently credible in terms of our record of principled behaviour, and sufficiently motivated to be able to make, individually, a significant impact on international relations in a way that is beyond the reach of small states. And we are states, I would argue, which generally (although this can wax and wane with changes of domestic government) bring a particular mindset to the conduct of our international relations, viz. one attracted to the use of middle power diplomacy.
I would describe ‘middle power diplomacy’, in turn, as having both a characteristic motivation and a characteristic method:
- the characteristic motivation is belief in the utility, and necessity, of acting cooperatively with others in addressing international challenges, particularly those global public goods problems which by their nature cannot be solved by any country acting alone, however big and powerful; and
- the characteristic diplomatic method is coalition building with ‘like-minded’ – those who, whatever their prevailing value systems, share specific interests and are prepared to work together to do something about them.
We can argue, and no doubt will on this panel, as to the extent to which middle powers, engaging in middle power diplomacy, can really be, in the words of this session’s title, ‘game changers in international affairs’ – and whether groupings like MIKTA within the G20 (bringing together we three countries with Turkey and South Korea), or the rapidly enlarging BRICS group (now with an emerging majority of middle power members and partners) will really make much difference.
My own view is that it’s certainly romantic to think that middle powers could ever have the kind of capacity to shape the world order that is exercised by the great powers – US and China. And maybe almost as romantic to think that we have, individually or collectively, the capacity exercised to a lesser but still sometimes significant extent (although more often regionally than globally) by second tier major powers like Russia and India.
Our impact I think is more likely to be on individual issues, involving what might be called ‘niche diplomacy’, than across the board. But that said, some of those niche roles can be of much greater than niche importance. Some examples:
- the role of Australia and Indonesia working together to craft and drive the Cambodian peace settlement
- the role of Mexico and others in initiating the nuclear ban treaty (TPNW)
- the role of Canada in initiating the prohibition of land mines
- the role of Norway in initiating the prohibition of cluster bombs; and
- the role of Canada, Australia and South Africa working together to initiate and achieve global consensus for the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) against mass atrocity crimes.
Looking forward in our own Asia-Pacific, or Indo-Pacific region, I think that even in the current very fraught geopolitical environment, there are ways the middle powers of this region could have a game-changing impact. For example:
- If ASEAN could better harness its collective middle-power energy and capacity it could be a more influential and effective regional security player than it now is: in particular in bringing peace to Myanmar, and pushing back in the South China Sea against China’s increasingly assertive encroachment. While China may not want to provoke violent conflict anywhere, it is clearly intent on recreating as much of historic, hegemonic, tributary relationship with its southern neighbours as it can get away with, and a united front of middle powers might be more effective in resisting this than relying on an increasingly erratic United States.
- A number of us are in a position to influence the nuclear weapons debate, as Australia, Mexico and Indonesia all have in the past. Had Australia and South Korea (along with our larger neighbour Japan) been willing, as US allies, to support President Obama’s move toward a ‘No First Use’ commitment, the world might have taken a significant step toward reducing the salience and legitimacy of the most indiscriminately inhumane and existentially threatening weapons ever invented. I live in hope that – if we can survive the Trump presidency – we will have that opportunity again.
Raw economic and political power will always count for a lot in international affairs. But it does not count for everything. Middle powers with a sense of where they want to go, and with the credibility, resources, and energy to follow through, can have a major impact in making this region and the wider world safer, saner and more prosperous. That is the challenge for all of us represented on this platform, and particularly the next generation of policy-makers so well represented in this audience. I believe we – and you – can deliver on it.
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