Whitlam's Magnificent Obsession: Why International Law still matters
2026 Whitlam Oration, Western Sydney University Whitlam Institute, Sydney, 28 October 2026
Gough Whitlam had during his political lifetime many magnificent obsessions. Who of my generation could ever forget Gough fulminating about interstate rail-gauge differences? Or being a passionate advocate for outer-suburban sewerage, about which Neville Wran offered his justly famous tribute: ‘It was said of Caesar Augustus that he found Rome brick, and left it marble. It will be said of Gough Whitlam that he found the outer suburbs of Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane unsewered, and left them fully flushed’.
But, to me, perhaps the most engaging of all Gough’s obsessions was his passionate commitment to the role and relevance of international law. Both for its own sake, in terms of contributing to a safer, saner, and more humane international order. But also for the role that international treaties could play, through creative application of the external affairs power in our Constiution, in making Australia itself a more liveable and decent country.
At a time now in world affairs when respect for international law, and for the intergovernmental institutions created and supported by it, is under greater threat than any of us can remember, it is appropriate to recall just how powerful, credible and influential Gough’s instincts, and achievements, were in this space, and how important international law continues to be today. So, I feel very deeply honoured and privileged to have been invited by the Whitlam Institute and family to give this year’s Whitlam Oration, which I will devote to just that subject.
The Whitlam Government. It was Gough Whitlam who, after he powered his way to the leadership of a deeply divided, moribund and unelectable Labor Party in the late 1960s, really set my own political juices flowing, and indeed those of my entire generation. I had been actively involved in student politics, but above all, it was the excitement of the Whitlam Government that really got me going, not just for all the ground breaking domestic reforms, but with its confidently optimistic foreign policymaking, as with so much else, matching the mood and needs of the time. Recognising China; bringing home our last troops from Vietnam; finally burying the White Australia policy; taking France to the World Court for its nuclear tests in the Pacific; and accelerating Papua New Guinea’s independence being just some of the decisions in that tumultuously active 1972-75 period which set Australia on a new path.
What particularly intrigued me about the Whitlam period at the time, and has continued to delight me since, was its essential continuity – after a long interregnum – with that earlier era of adventurous Labor foreign policy-making under Curtin, Chifley and, above all, H.V. Evatt. Brilliant lawyer, former High Court judge, and External Affairs Minister from 1941 to 1949, Doc Evatt was a spectacularly flawed character – vain, paranoid, by all accounts almost impossible to work with, and capable of alarming political misjudgement, not least when he later became leader of the Opposition. But it was Evatt who effectively created Australian foreign policy, in the sense of matching a real desire to pursue our own national external interests with some independent capacity to do so.
Evatt’s most striking contribution was his internationalism – his very real commitment to international law, and the building of cooperative multilateral institutions and processes to address both security and development objectives. His role in the founding of the United Nations is the stuff of which legends are made, and rightly so – especially in his fight for the rights of the smaller powers against the great powers in the respective roles of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in his faith in the United Nations as an agent for social and economic reform and as a protector of human rights.
There was not much left of Evatt’s cooperative internationalism by the end of the long reign of Robert Menzies and his successors. Menzies’s excruciating Anglophilia; the maintenance until the late 1960s of the full vigour of the White Australia policy; the stridency of our support for Verwoerd’s South Africa; the reinforcement of our perceived racist credentials by the casting vote of Sir Percy Spender in the South West Africa case in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which delayed Namibian independence for the best part of a generation; the intensity of our antagonism toward China; the totality of our dependence upon the United States; and the ultimate comprehensive misjudgement of our intervention in Vietnam – all these combined to reinforce the image, and the reality, of an Australia largely isolated and irrelevant in its own region, deeply unsure of its identity, utterly pessimistic about its ability to be a force for change in its own right, and in any event wholly unclear about what kind of change it would want to pursue if it could.
Whitlam well and truly broke this mould, and in brilliant style. He was, among many other things, our first prime minister to really get it as to why international law matters so much, not least for a country like our own. As he said in a speech in July 1975:
We see international law as an integral part of Australian policy formulation and the projection of those policies internationally. We believe that international law – and by that I include not only the rules of international law but also the law-making and law-applying processes and the formal and informal institutions – provides the only alternative to tension, chaos and destruction.
As long as international law has existed — and its origins go back centuries, although most multilateral rule making and institution building has been the product of the last hundred years — there has been scepticism about its relevance and utility, even among those most attracted to its ideals and believing most strongly in its indispensability in shaping a safer, saner, more just, equitable and prosperous world.
This body of rules has always had its detractors — on the ground of its inherent unenforceability without the cooperation of multiple national actors, or the challenge it poses to extreme realist theories of international relations. It too often operates in the shadows of global politics, its rules all too routinely violated by those with both the muscle and inclination to prioritise their own narrowly perceived interests.
But it is hard to argue against the proposition that everyone’s national interests are ultimately best served by a rule-based rather than realpolitik-based international order conducting international life either without principled standards, or with double standards.
Whitlam understood instinctively all the reasons why international law matters so much, or at least should matter so much, to Australia. Partly it is a matter of our inherited British legal tradition, which seems to retain more resonance for us than for our great and powerful fellow-former-colony across the Pacific: treaty obligations are sacrosanct, and we take pains to observe to the full rules of customary international law.
Partly it is a matter of straightforward national interest: given the relative modesty, in global terms, of Australia’s political, economic and military power, our security and economic interests manifestly are best served by a rule-based, rather than realpolitik-based, international order.
Partly it is recognition of the reality, which ought to be more universally acknowledged than it is, that a principled, rule-based order is manifestly not just in our but every state’s interest. Not just in basic, technical standard-setting in areas like telecommunications, aviation and maritime safety, and intellectual property. But in creating the conditions for sustainable peace and security. And in meeting big transnational challenges that are beyond the capacity of any single nation, no matter how powerful, to solve alone.
And partly it is because the treaties, conventions and institutions created by international law are crucial vehicles – or at least potential vehicles – for protecting and advancing basic human rights around the world, a commitment demanded by our common humanity.
Whitlam translated all those perceptions and understandings about the critical importance of international law, both for the world and Australia, into a quite astonishing record of achievement, which I am delighted to acknowledge has been meticulously and exhaustively documented in a long article in the Melbourne University Law Review in 2016, from which I shall unashamedly steal, by my indomitable friend for over half a century – and every law student’s favourite High Court judge – Michael Kirby.
Within a week of taking office in 1972 Whitlam signed the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and over the three short years of his government, an extraordinary 133 international instruments entered into force – through 26 exchange of notes agreements, 32 bilateral agreements, 16 multilateral agreements, 17 protocols, 8 international statutes and 34 treaties or conventions. The list included ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was enacted into domestic law by the Racial Discrimination Act; the Convention on the Political Rights of Women; the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise; the Refugee Protocol; the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As Gough said, rightly, in the speech in July 1975 from which I have already quoted:
We have done a great deal more, I believe, than all previous governments. We have communicated to the world our commitment to international law and our eagerness to commit to cooperative endeavours. We have displayed a breadth of legal skills. And Australia has come to be regarded as an independent voice.
A magnificent obsession indeed, magnificently realised.
Subsequent Governments. The conservative Fraser government which followed Whitlam from 1975-83, while more than happy to re-embrace Cold War verities, did continue to foster closer links in our region and saved Australia from becoming the international pariah it would have been had Coalition support for apartheid, and its manifest discomfort with decolonisation, persisted. But what was missing from its approach to foreign policymaking was not only the passionate commitment to international law, but the whole spirit of activist, optimistic adventure, which had so characterised the Whitlam period, and of Evatt before it. It was this, above all, that was recreated by the Hawke and Keating Governments of which I was part.
I was lucky enough – and luckier in this respect than my predecessor, Bill Hayden – to become Foreign Minister in 1988, just as the Cold War ice-floes were breaking up, a new era of cooperative international problem-solving dawned for the major powers, and opportunities opened up everywhere for other players, certainly middle powers of Australia’s stature, to stretch their wings and find new ways out of old dead-ends — as we did in leading the way on issues like peace in Cambodia, the Chemical Weapons Convention, financial sanctions against apartheid, and building new Asia-Pacific economic and security architecture. It was an extraordinary period of global transformation and, as I wrote in my published memoir a few years ago: ‘Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be Foreign Minister was very heaven!’
I have to acknowledge that I brought to my new ministerial role only a very modest understanding of international law, its doctrinal underpinnings and detailed case law. I had not spent much time on it at Law School. And, to this day, if you want a description of the scope of ius cogens, and whether its reach is coterminous with obligations erga omnes, I’m not your man. But what I did bring to that role from the outset was a strong view about the importance of international law in the scheme of things.
This was essentially for all the general reasons for taking it seriously I listed earlier, but also reinforced in my case by a strong personal distaste for the sheer moral indecency of conducting international life either without principled standards, or with double standards. And that distaste remains unsuppressed today, despite all the years I have spent tramping diplomatic corridors and sitting around international conference tables, not to mention all the insensitivity training one accumulates over 21 years in domestic politics.
In office I sought to conceptualise that instinct by arguing that Australia’s national interests, like those of every other country, should be understood as not just confined to the familiar duo of security and prosperity, but as extending to a distinct third category: being and being seen to be a good international citizen. By that I meant being willing to engage in cooperative international action — very much including through the effective application of international law — to advance public goods like eliminating extreme poverty, pandemics, atrocity crimes, environmental destruction and nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
My argument was designed to appeal not just to moralists but hard-headed realists, making the point that behaving, and being seen to behave decently and not just self-interestedly, worked greatly to a to country’s advantage reputationally and in other ways when it came to advancing traditional security and economic interests. Soft power may have had its day in this new Trumpian world we inhabit, but it worked for me, and I think it is fair to say for Australia, during my term, and I have continued to argue to this day the case for treating good international citizenship not just as an optional add on but as a core national interest in its own right,
As Foreign Minister, and in some cases continuing well into my post-political incarnations at the International Crisis Group and elsewhere, I made a number of specific efforts to influence international law-making and enforcement, some of them reasonably successful, others less so. In four areas in particular: advancing the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, responding effectively to genocide and other crimes against humanity, advancing the cause of environmental protection, and (probably a more Quixotic aspiration than all the others put together) reforming the UN by making it a more effective protector of international peace and security.
On weapons of mass destruction, our greatest success here was unquestionably bringing to conclusion in 1992, after some twenty years of inconclusive negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention, which remains the most comprehensive of all the various WMD treaty regimes. On nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, we were among the leaders in the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) initiated by the UN General Assembly, arguing for the illegality of nuclear weapons, as the most indiscriminately inhumane ever devised. The Court’s advisory opinion in 1996 went some of the way down that path but not as far as we had hoped. It remains the only occasion on which I personally appeared before the ICJ, and I have to say I remember it best for the total inconsequentiality of the oral proceedings, with in those days uninterrupted set-piece presentations and absolutely no questioning or other substantive exchanges between bench and bar. I enjoyed the majestic formality of it all, but my part could perfectly well have been played by a well-trained Major Mitchell cockatoo.
The other major nuclear initiative of the Hawke–Keating Governments was our sponsorship of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. This gathered together, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Richard Butler – who had learned his trade, inter alia, as Principal Private Secretary to Gough Whitlam after the Dismissal – an extraordinary cross-section of the world’s best minds on these issues, including former heads of the UK defence forces and US Strategic Air Command. And it produced a strongly argued unanimous report. It made, for the first time at this level, a compelling case for a nuclear weapon free world, in terms that have been widely quoted ever since, even if they have not borne the practical fruit we hoped for:
So long as any state has … nuclear arms others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any state’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. And any such use would be catastrophic for life on this planet as we know it.
On genocide and other mass atrocity crimes, preventing, halting, and redressing their consequences was a preoccupation during my time as Foreign Minister – and has continued throughout my post-political life to this day with my efforts, often frustrated though they have been, to articulate and implement the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). The most notable contribution of the Hawke-Keating government in this area was Australia’s lead role in bringing to an end the catastrophic civil war in Cambodia which followed the Khmer Rouge genocide. Our particular contribution — which we backed up with an immense diplomatic effort to sell the idea, and a comprehensive study (working with Indonesia) to demonstrate its feasibility — was to propose that the UN play an unprecedentedly central role in the transitional administration of the country, thereby giving China a face-saving way of withdrawing its support for the Khmer Rouge, the continuation of which in the past had stymied all previous peace efforts.
On global environmental protection, this had nothing like the salience when I was Foreign Minister that it does today, but was beginning to gain political traction, with issues like the ozone layer attracting public and governmental attention, and global warming just beginning to do so. Bob Hawke, to his credit, saw the writing on the wall earlier and more clearly than most, and certainly more than I did. The talismanic issue in this respect became protecting the Antarctic wilderness from the potential ravages of oil and mineral exploration. Australia mounted a global campaign which bore spectacular fruit with the Madrid Protocol of 1991, which effectively banned both mining and exploration in perpetuity.
Where Hawke and I were in complete harmony was to employ, back in 1983 when I was Attorney-General, the Commonwealth’s external affairs power under the Constitution to achieve environmental protection objectives otherwise completely within the jurisdiction of the states. Our triumph in this respect – not without a few personal political bumps along the way – was to harness our international treaty obligations under the World Heritage Convention, ratified by the Whitlam Government, to stop the Tasmanian Government destroying a magnificent wilderness area with the construction of the Gordon-below-Franklin Dam.
UN reform, the last of the four issues on my Hawke-Keating Government checklist, was a lively topic in those optimistic immediate post-Cold War years, and Australia played itself very much into a central role in the debate with the publication in 1993, and launch at UN headquarters in New York, of my ‘Blue Book’, as it became widely known, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. Its 250 pages offered clear definitions of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding; identified the range of possible responses, and criteria for decision-makers, in confronting different kinds of conflict prevention and reaction situations; and made specific proposals for both process and structural reform in the UN system. Very well received though it was, the unhappy reality remains that the forces of inertia prevailed, and three decades later most of its prescriptions for international security system reform remain just as pertinent now as they did then.
Australia’s activist, and more often than not seen as successful, approach to international law making and enforcement during my years in office did not have the longevity I might have hoped. Throughout John Howard’s long term, which followed Labor’s from 1996 to 2007, foreign policy was dominated by the Prime Minister himself, who was and remains the quintessential pessimistic realist: over-focused on hard rather than soft power; deeply comfortable in following the US alliance lead wherever it took us — above all the ‘war on terror’ after 9/11 in 2001, and into Iraq without observing any international law niceties in 2003; unadventurous in seeking global or regional policy change; and (with about the only exception I can think of being its active role in bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to conclusion) profoundly uninterested in the UN and the whole idea of transnational problem-solving by creative multilateral cooperation and international law-making.
The later Coalition governments of Abbott, Turnbull and Morrison, in office from 2013 to 2022 after the six-year Rudd-Gillard-Rudd Labor inter-re gnum, basically followed this Howard-era playbook, although Malcolm Turnbull always claimed to have liberal internationalist instincts, and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop played a creditable role in occupying the Security Council seat which Labor Government campaigning had, against its will, bequeathed it.
Despite the political tumult of his years in office, Kevin Rudd, both as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, did try to recapture much of the confident optimism of the Hawke–Keating years, with its very strong focus on multilateral cooperation, and he explicitly reinstated ‘good international citizenship’ as a central policy theme. That was most evident in his work on climate change; in building the role of the G20 in global economic management and potentially on a wider front; in creating (albeit after a few diplomatic slips along the way) important new regional architecture in the expanded East Asian Summit; and in campaigning to claw back a seat at the table for Australia in the UN Security Council.
Since regaining office in 2022, Labor under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong has reasserted the Party’s strong traditional commitment to effective multilateralism. There has been a welcome determination to seek again a seat on the UN Security Council in 2029-30, and a willingness to use our General Assembly voice in criticising indefensible violations of the UN Charter, especially by Russia in Ukraine, and egregious breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law, including by Israel. And with Energy Minister Chris Bowen’s high-level engagement in the COP process, we are certainly pulling our weight in the global climate debate.
Both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have emphasised in their recent speeches the imperative for all nations to abide by the rules and norms that shape the international system on which we rely, making clear that any collapse of the global rules-based order poses a particular threat to middle powers like Australia.
That said, in all Penny Wong’s speeches articulating Australia’s foreign policy priorities, for example her Allan Gyngell lecture to the Lowy Institute in August this year, the attention given to supporting the rules of the multilateral system comes a rather distant third to two other ‘r’s: commitment to the region, and to restoring, strengthening and diversifying bilateral relationships. I do admire the intensity and professionalism of the effort she has devoted to rebuilding previously frayed relationships around Asia and in the Pacific, and to navigating our way through the contest between the US and China (albeit, I would argue, with rather more deference to the US than it currently deserves), insisting that we want a region in which ‘no country dominates, and no country is dominated’.
But I have to say I do remain disappointed that our current Labor government has shown no interest at all in re-articulating ‘good international citizenship’ as a central conceptual theme of its foreign policy, with all the commitment that I believe comes with that, as I have described, to issues like peacebuilding, foreign aid, human rights advocacy and arms control, not just regionally but globally. Penny does talk about her support for ‘constructive internationalism’ as being a kind of functional equivalent to good international citizenship, but I am not persuaded that this language does the job: it implies general support for multilateral institutions and processes, but involves no real commitment to any particular courses of policy action through them.
Looking Forward. What I do have to acknowledge, looking forward, is that the times are currently about as unpropitious as they could be for adventurous activity by Australia, or anyone else – including the world’s middle powers in combination, following Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos call to arms – in shaping constructive new international law and ensuring its most effective possible implementation.
The unhappy reality we have to face is that the whole concept of international law is under greater stress than it has been within any of our living memories, with the major offenders being the three dominant permanent members of the UN Security Council – and the world’s current biggest military powers – treating with contempt the foundations of the peaceful global order they are pledged to uphold. There has been China, with its militarization of the South China Sea in complete disregard of the international law of the sea. There has been Russia, with its totally indefensible invasion of Ukraine, in brazen defiance of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. And, in many ways most alarmingly of all, there has been the United States, which – shining beacon of all the governance virtues that it has always claimed to be – under President Trump has completely abandoned any pretence of decency.
There are many times in the past – not least, within all our memories, the catastrophic invasion of Iraq in 2003 – when the US, consumed by a sense of its own rectitude and exceptionalism, has acted with indifference to the constraints posed by international law. But at least those misadventures were almost invariably accompanied by a semi-believable attempt to claim some higher moral or global security justification for the action in question.
Things are very different now under Trump, who the whole world now recognises, whether its leaders are impolite enough to say so publicly or not, to be a moronic, corrupt, solipsistic vulgarian, who surrounds himself with a combination of acolytes with big hair, big teeth and no discernible competence, or shameless opportunists like Vance and Rubio with plenty of competence but no discernible character, leaving no adults left in the room, as there were in his first administration, to curb his worst instincts.
So, we have had the 2025 strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites, without any pretence of a legally defensible imminent threat to Israel or anyone else, and the equally indefensible and counterproductive new war waged against it, at Israel’s behest, since February this year. We had the body-snatch of Venezuelan President Maduro in January. We have seen the beyond-disgraceful support for Putin over Zelensky in the Ukraine war, most recently his tearing up of the sanctions against Russian diesel fuel exports to give what has been estimated as one day’s supply for American drivers – a massive strategic concession to Russia for a rounding error in the national accounts. We have seen the withdrawal of funding and other support for a whole raft of international institutions, including the UNHCR, WFP, WHO and WTO. And to me probably most disgracefully of all, the pursuit of sanctions against the dedicated personnel of the International Criminal Court, and the announced determination to ensure its complete destruction after the awarding of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize to its former judge Navi Pillay.
The biggest threat to international law lies not in its occasional breach – that happens in all legal systems – but in its contemptuous dismissal. And that is exactly how Trump, and all those in his administration wretchedly subservient to him, has treated it during his time in office, the nadir being his New York Times interview in January 2026, when he said that “I don’t need international law” and that the only constraint on his power as president of the US was “my own morality, my own mind.”
It may be that I am being overly gloomy. Maybe we are seeing the beginning of the end of the age of indecency, with the defeats this week of Bolsonaro in Brazil, Vucic in Serbia, hopefully today Netanyahu in Israel, and hopefully next week Trump’s Republicans in the US mid-terms. Perhaps it is the case that the present, and future, generation of leaders and potential leaders of the major powers are at last beginning to learn some necessary lessons. That military might does not necessarily guarantee victory or dominance, or one’s own security. That nuclear weapons are not the assets they are so often assumed to be, proving simply not useable for either deterrence or compellance. That trade coercion is a double-edged sword from which there can emerge no winners.
It may even be beginning to dawn on the US administration that trying to preserve US primacy in the Asia-Pacific is a lost cause, and that a far more intelligent and rational approach than confrontation to dealing with the rise of China is pursuit of détente, with the Xi-Trump summit language of ‘strategic stability’ being a hopefully significant step forward in this respect. But the jury is very much still out on whether the world really is beginning to restabilise, or whether these are just straws in the wind.
In this still horribly difficult and uncertain environment, what if anything can we in Australia, and others around the world who share our belief in the crucial importance of international law, and the desperate need to restore its salience, actually do to advance that cause? Probably, to be frank, not all that much. But maybe, finally, just these three things.
First, internationally, keep the flame alive. By calling out, loudly, clearly and unequivocally egregious breaches of international law for what they are, by whomever they are perpetrated, including our closest friends and allies. By giving such military support as we reasonably can to countries like Ukraine defending themselves against indefensibly unlawful cross-border aggression. By making clear our abhorrence not only at the horrific Hamas attacks of October 7, but at the massively disproportionate Israeli military response in Gaza over the last three years, in manifest breach of international humanitarian law. And by unequivocally supporting international judicial institutions like the ICJ and ICC when they are clearly acting with integrity and within the bounds of their respective mandates, and being a consistent voice for decency in a world still in danger of losing any sense of what that means.
Second, domestically, embrace the substance, if not necessarily the terminology, of ‘good international citizenship’ (with respect for international law and practice at its heart) as not just a discretionary add-on, but a core national interest in its own right, just as important as our national interests in security and economic prosperity. The horror of the attack this month on Indi MP Helen Haines has hopefully started, with strong support from the Prime Minister and Governor-General, an overdue national conversation on the desperate need to restore a spirit of decency in the conduct of our domestic affairs. I would argue that, equally desperately important as it is to restore a spirit of decency in the conduct of international affairs, a good place to start would be for Australia to re-commit to being and being seen to be a good international citizen, and to advocate that others do likewise.
My last prescription is simply this: stay optimistic. Remember that wheels do turn, presidents and prime ministers do change, and that in foreign policy, as in life itself, outlooks — both pessimism and optimism — can be self-fulfilling, and self-reinforcing. If we want to change the world for the better, we must not only keep coming up with creative new solutions to particular problems but start by believing that change is possible. That is the challenge now for us in Australia, as everywhere else, and I hope we are up for it.
Gough Whitlam, bless his memory, certainly would have been.
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