AUSTRALIA'S COMMITMENT TO GLOBAL MULTILATERALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

Address by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the La Trobe University Conference "The United Nations: Between Sovereignty and Global Governance", 2 July 1995.

Reintegrating the United Nations

Six years ago the fall of the Berlin Wall brought to an end forty years of sterile confrontation between the super powers. The world was a more optimistic place in 1989 than it is today. Those six years, with their nightmarish scenes of conflict in places like Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda and Somalia, have shown how illusory were the hopes that the Cold War would be replaced by a new era of peace and security for the world's people. They have brought their full measure of challenge for the international community and the United Nations. They have shown that the United Nations, and the member states that make it up, have not yet developed a clear and confident sense of the UN's own role in the new environment with which we are confronted - where the most common source of conflict is no longer disputes between states, but explosive conflict <u>within</u> states. That form of conflict has far exceeded the more traditional threats to peace from conflicts between states with which the UN was familiar. No less than 79 of the 82 armed conflicts which occurred around the world between 1989 and 1992 were conflicts within states. And in 1993, the last year for which we have complete data, every one of the 34 armed conflicts which occurred was intrastate in character.

More often than not these conflicts have been expressed in the form of competing ethno-nationalist or religious claims. Of course ethnic or religious difference is not, by itself, a recipe for conflict within states. Australia is just one example, among many, of a highly successful multi-ethnic, multicultural society in which tolerance and peace prevail. For ethnic or religious differences or competing nationalist aspirations to deteriorate into deadly conflict, something more is necessary. And almost invariably that something has been a failure of governments to deliver basic needs and satisfy the most basic aspirations of their citizens. In almost every case of major intra-state conflict of recent times, from the former Soviet Republics to Rwanda, ethnic and religious conflict has been associated with declining GNP per capita, the rise of demagogic politics, and the collapse of effective, responsible government.

All this means that it is no longer possible, in the post Cold War era, for the international community to simply ignore, as it largely did in the past, conflict occurring within state borders which does not significantly impact on other states. The compartmentalisation

which existed during the Cold War years - in which peace and security issues, development issues, and human rights and justice issues were treated as being in completely different conceptual and institutional boxes - no longer seems adequate to deal with the real world distress that so many people are suffering. Basic economic needs, let alone the needs of individuals and groups for dignity and liberty, cannot begin to be met in environments where nobody's personal security can be guaranteed. And that means, in turn, that the international community cannot simply turn away from being involved in protecting human security in many of those situations which might previously have been regarded as wholly internal in character.

Of course this truth has, of course, already been recognised to the extent that the UN has become involved in places such as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. But for the most part that involvement has been hesitant, half-hearted, lacking in confidence, worried about its rationale, too little and too late. The need, as I argued in my speech to the General Assembly last year, is for us to recapture some of the original vision built into the aims of the UN Charter. Crucially we have to reintegrate the relationship between the three basic objectives of peace (meeting the need for security), development (meeting economic needs) and human rights and justice (meeting the needs for individual and group dignity and liberty).

The distinction between 'peace and security' on the one hand and 'development' on the other has too often been a matter for sterile and unhelpful debate, with attempts to trade off one for the other as key goals for the United Nations. Any viable modern concept of international peace, including peace within states, must recognise that the two are indissolubly bound up with each other: there can be no sustainable peace without development, no development without peace. But the international community has traditionally talked about security in almost wholly military terms. In a UN context, *collective security* has meant member states renouncing the use of force against each other and agreeing to come to the aid of a member when attacked. Even the more recent, and very welcome, focus on the concept of *common security* has been premised on military ideas, the principle that states will be more secure militarily with defence strategies that are aimed at building security with others rather than against them.

If the international community is to respond fully and effectively to the new challenges of the post-Cold War era, this perspective has to be broadened. One way to do that is to talk, as many are now doing, in terms of *comprehensive security* - which conveys the important idea that security is multi-dimensional in character, demanding attention not only to political and diplomatic disputes but to economic under-development, trade disputes, human rights abuses and the like.

But Australia's preference - as I have spelt out in the book *Cooperating for Peace* - is to describe our shared objective as *cooperative security*. The term 'cooperative security' is designed to embrace, and capture the essence of, the earlier ideas of collective, common

and comprehensive security. It is designed to shift the focus away from traditional, defensive, state-centred thinking - and at the same time convey the flavour of consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism. Under a cooperative security approach, challenges to peace can be matched by a set of responses graduated to cover the entire spectrum of situations, both before and after the threshold of armed conflict has been crossed. At one extreme this would involve long-term programs to improve economic and social conditions which are likely to give rise to further tensions. At the other end, it includes the enforcement of peace by military means.

There are good practical reasons for concentrating on the <u>preventive</u> end of this spectrum, with strategies of peace building and preventive diplomacy. It has become absolutely clear, in a world where commitment and resources are always likely to fall short of aspirations, that it makes far more sense to concentrate efforts on peace building and other preventive strategies than on after-the-event peace restoration which will always be more expensive in terms of loss of life and economic costs.

The United Nations' Role in Peace Building

At the heart of the notion of peace building is the idea of meeting needs: for security and order, for a reasonable standard of living, and for recognition of identity and worth. Conflict, whether cross-border or in-country, typically begins, and continues, when important interests or needs of one or more parties are frustrated, threatened or remain unfulfilled. To a large extent peace building involves doing exactly the sorts of things that a civilised international community, and the states that make it up, should be doing anyway - that is, putting in place effective international rules-systems, dispute resolution mechanisms and cooperative arrangements; meeting basic economic, social, cultural and humanitarian needs; and rebuilding societies that have been shattered by war or other major crises. But too often in the past these things, while seen as worthwhile in their own right, have not been identified clearly enough as absolutely integral to the achievement and maintenance of peace and security, and as a result have been given less than the attention they deserve. If we are to achieve just and durable peace in the post-Cold War world, it is crucially important that the international community not continue to make that mistake.

Peace building strategies fall into two broad groups which may be described, respectively, as 'international regimes' and 'in-country peace building'. At the international level, we are talking essentially about various regimes and arrangements designed to minimise threats to security, promote confidence and trust, and create frameworks for dialogue and cooperation - especially through arms control and disarmament treaties; legal regimes such as those on maritime passage and the status of refugees; dispute resolution mechanisms like the International Court of Justice; and multilateral dialogue forums, like the OSCE or the new ASEAN Regional Forum. At the in-country level, peace building

essentially involves strategies to encourage economic development, ensure the observance of human rights broadly defined, and to facilitate good governance.

The UN is intimately involved in the substantial framework of rules and structures which permeate every facet of international relations, at the global, regional and bilateral levels. These cover virtually every field of interstate activity - including diplomatic relations, maritime affairs, international environmental protection, human rights, resource management and allocation, and international trade and communications. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, for example, has a role in promoting peace and security by regulating conflicting claims over waters and continental shelves and the passage of vessels and aircraft. Because resource shortages - of, for example, water, oil, minerals, fish - can exacerbate international tensions there is a need for such things as And the draft agreement on the conservation and management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks currently being negotiated in the UN has a security role in helping prevent the tensions which can arise over competition for scarce resources.

The United Nations in the Asia Pacific Region

The UN's work in these areas - globally, regionally and nationally - affects us all, if at times almost invisibly. But what specifically does the United Nations offer us in our own Asia Pacific region? There has certainly been a long history of involvement on the macro level. The United Nations has played a central role in some of the region's key events over the past 50 years, including the achievement of Indonesian independence and decolonisation elsewhere, the Korean War, and the negotiated settlement in Cambodia.

But it is often overlooked that, as well as grappling with situations of potential or actual armed conflict in the region, the United Nations is involved - sometimes in the face of great difficulty and often with only rare recognition - through its subsidiary bodies and agencies in extensive programs of economic and social development that are essential to the concept of peace building. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for example, has played a conspicuous role in our region, in particular through its assistance to Indo-Chinese refugees in the 1970s and 1980s. The Western Pacific Regional Office of the World Health Organisation (WHO) is located in Manila. Organisations such as the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) have also figured largely in development and technical programs in the Asia Pacific region.

There is as well the UN's specially created regional body, ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific), which was established as a forum for discussion of issues affecting the whole region from Iran to the Cook islands, and to act as a regional centre for technical assistance, a research centre and as a source of information for development of activities. Perhaps as a result of its impossibly diverse constituency,

ESCAP has had an at best mixed record and reputation over the years - as indeed has been the case with the other formal UN regional bodies (ECA, ECE, ECALC and ESCWA, none of them exactly household names...). Australia has been a major donor member from the outset, and has sought consistently to encourage reform of the organisation to take account of changing regional priorities.

One other UN organisation integrally linked with the economic development of the region is the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which was established under the auspices of the then ECAFE (now ESCAP) in 1965. The Bank makes loans for the economic and social advancement of developing member countries; provides technical assistance for the preparation and execution of development projects, and cooperates with the UN, and other organisations investing development funds in the region.

Regional Organisations in the Asia Pacific Region

Besides these bodies, there are, of course, several regional organisations concerned both with economic development and peace and security which have no formal connection with the United Nations. The most embracing in membership, and potentially significant in role, are APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Launched in 1989, and therefore a truly post-Cold War organisation, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is directed to expanding trade and investment flows across a region that is the fastest growing and most dynamic in the global economy, with a market of more than 2 billion people, a GNP more than half the world's total, and nearly half the world's trade. APEC brings together a grouping which by the year 2020 will include, according to some estimates, seven of the world's ten largest economies and which, by the end of the century, will account for 57 per cent of world trade.

There is an obvious relationship between the development of habits of cooperation on economic issues and peace building. Economic interdependence and shared growth reduces the scope for tensions based on poverty and rivalry. The processes of open dialogue which distinguish APEC, including the meetings of Heads of Government, contribute directly to the growth of mutual confidence and the reduction of tensions. Recent history has shown how serious the risk is of trade frictions across the Pacific escalating, with potentially wider damage to the region's security, and how important it is that APEC is able to include the US, China and Japan in a common multilateral framework helping prevent the Orwellian spectre of a world divided into three hostile trade blocs in Europe, Asia and the Americas.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established just last year as a multilateral dialogue forum designed specifically to encourage trust and confidence building and cooperative activity in security matters. It grew out of the long established annual ASEAN

ministerial dialogue forum (known as the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference). The ARF includes not only the ASEAN six and their existing regional dialogue partners (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, the United States and Canada - and the EU as well), but also their consultative partners (Russia and China) and observers (Laos, PNG and Vietnam): basically all eighteen major security players in the Asia Pacific region. Despite the historic enmity between some of the countries represented around the table, there was, at the inaugural meeting in Bangkok last year, an open and substantive exchange of views of the post Cold War regional strategic environment, covering such things as the Korean situation, non-proliferation and arms modernisation in the region. Since the first meeting there have been intersessional gatherings on trust-building, preventive diplomacy and peace keeping, and the atmosphere looks promising for further evolution of the Forum at the second meeting in Brunei early next month.

ASEAN itself has of course been an important regional organisation. Established in 1967, and embracing Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei, its prime function has been to accelerate economic development in South East Asia. The organisation acquired a more overt security dimension in 1976 with the Treaty on Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia (Bali Treaty), which set out principles of mutual respect for the independence and sovereignty of all nations, non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, and settlement of disputes by peaceful means. ASEAN also played a particularly important role throughout the history of the Cambodian problem - especially in opposing the Vietnamese invasion of the country, and then in assisting the peace process.

In the light of recent events directly affecting the South Pacific, there is at least one other regional organisation I should specifically mention here - the South Pacific Forum, a grouping of the independent and self-governing countries of the South Pacific. Established in 1971, the Forum focuses on economic, social and cultural cooperation in the region although it occasionally turns its attention to security issues - most recently, of course, less than two weeks ago when I led a Forum delegation to the French Government to try to persuade the French to reverse their decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

Regional Organisations and the United Nations

It should be clear from this description of the UN and regional architecture that structures do exist, if sometimes in a nascent, evolutionary stage, for dealing with security, humanitarian, economic, diplomatic and other such issues that arise in the region. But what role will - or should - regional organisations play in the overall multilateral security structure, particularly within the concept of cooperative security?

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter addresses the place of regional arrangements or agencies - which I will refer to as collectively as regional organisations - in the cooperative security

system. Regional organisations are empowered to deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, and are encouraged to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council, whether on their own initiative or by reference from the Security Council. Where appropriate, the Security Council is empowered to use regional organisations for enforcement action under its authority, with no regional organisation being permitted to take enforcement action unless so authorised by the Security Council.

The UN Secretary-General in *An Agenda for Peace* called for greater involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the UN's peace-related activities, including preventive diplomacy, a call reinforced by the Security Council in January 1993. But neither the Secretary-General nor Council (nor, for that matter, Chapter VIII itself) make any attempt to prescribe which arrangements or agencies should be so involved. Some of the regional organisations not part of the UN system already have a linkage with it, formal or informal, usually in relation to peace and security matters. A number of regional bodies have a standing invitation to participate in the General Assembly's work - the South Pacific Forum, for example, was admitted as a General Assembly observer after the beginning of UNGA49. Others, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab League have worked closely with the Security Council on peace and security matters. All but the OAS have entered into framework agreements for cooperation with the UN. These organisations have an express mandate to address and respond to security issues or, in the absence of such a mandate, have developed the necessary functions through practice or need.

But there are many existing regional arrangements and agencies with the potential to become involved in the UN's peace-related activities, including preventive diplomacy, which currently do not have any formal or informal links with the United Nations In practice, most regional organisations embody agreements among geographically-concentrated groups of states for cooperative action on issues of mutual interest (for example, the OAU, OAS and Arab League). Others are brought together by shared experience only partly related, if at all, to geography (for example, the OIC). All are bound internally by perceived common interest. Yet each is different from the other, in mandate, scope and composition, and in inclination and capacity to take on the functions envisaged under Chapter VIII, whether alone or in cooperation with the UN. . The Secretary-General has recognised this in his statement in *An Agenda for Peace* that there could be no formal pattern in the relationship between the UN and regional organisations. The forms of interaction must necessarily be flexible, without rigid division of responsibility, and appropriate to the circumstances of each regional organisation and each issue.

Just as it leaves open the interpretation of arrangements of agencies falling under Chapter VIII, the UN Charter does not define the manner and extent to which regional

organisations should develop their security role. Article 52 stipulates that 'local disputes' be addressed in the first instance by regional organisations, if at all possible, but does not elaborate further on what matters are appropriate for regional action. It is for each regional organisation to determine what the parameters of this role should be. In practice, this seems to mean that issues are appropriate for regional action when regional states deem them to be so. This might be because a threat or dispute has multilateral dimensions, with several states involved (for example, the South China Sea dispute) or with regional implications going beyond the immediate disputants (for example, in the case of Cambodia). In other circumstances, states may conclude that there is no longer scope or reason to pursue their local dispute by bilateral means, and may wish to place the matter on the regional agenda. This step, while externalising the problem, falls short of the greater symbolism which comes from referring the matter to the UN; so long as the matter is addressed at regional level, and not further 'internationalised', the parties may feel that is has not escalated beyond their control.

There are obvious limitations as to what regional organisations can do. For the most part they lack the UN's basic resources, experience and capacity to oblige member states to contribute financially to any dispute resolution activities they might undertake. Accordingly, they rarely have the resources to address problems once they have escalated beyond a certain level. Their mandate may be inadequate to address properly all dimensions of a problem. They may lack the necessary persuasive influence, especially in circumstances where there is political division among member states or where a predominant regional power is closely involved. And, although they will usually be closer to the parties, proximity to a dispute may in fact hamper effective mediation. For example, it is almost inconceivable that the dialogue currently taking place between Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General over the future of East Timor could even have been organised - let alone made to work - within a regional context. To the extent that any generalisation is possible, I agree with the emphasis that has been suggested by Singapore UN diplomat Mark Hong Tat Soon, that 'the logical approach for regional organisations is to concentrate on fulfilling their roles in areas where they have comparative advantage... these areas are early warning, information gathering and preventive diplomacy.'

In fact, there are relatively few documented cases of practical cooperation on the ground between the UN and regional organisations in preventive approaches, and there is no fixed practice as to whether the UN or a regional organisation should take the lead in dispute resolution. The most important point is that any cooperative arrangement between the UN and regional organisations must be sufficiently adaptable to meet each situation as it arises. In some cases, it may be best for the regional organisation to take the lead and carry out preventive diplomacy with consultation and back-up by the UN; in other cases, it may be more advantageous for the UN to carry out the function with consultation and back-up from regional organisations. In still other instances, both parties acting together may provide the most powerful approach, underlining to protagonists the unanimity of the

international community. Coordination of efforts is, of course, essential in order to avoid the diffusion of responsibility which can occur when both the UN and the regional organisation think that the other should be handling a given situation.

Role of Asia Pacific Regional Organisations in Cooperative Security

What scope then exists for regional organisations in the Asia Pacific to enter into agreements for practical cooperation with the UN within the context of cooperative security?

In terms of <u>peace building strategies</u>, the United Nations will necessarily have a role to play in many strategies pursued by the ARF, as these initiatives will sometimes involve functions performed by UN bodies or specialised agencies. The roles played by the UN and the ARF should be complementary and mutually reinforcing. For example, the ARF might assist the UNHCR in issues relating to refugees; we have already seen the development of a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) under UNHCR which, following on from a proposal by ASEAN countries in the UN General Assembly in 1989, is a major and successful step towards the eventual resolution of the problem of refugees and irregular migration from Indochina. There will also be potential for cooperation on environmental issues such as energy and resource management, in conjunction with UN bodies such as the International Maritime Organisation, the Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Division of the UN Secretariat, the UN Environment Program and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. It will be important for the ARF should continue the pattern developed by other regional organisations of liaising with the UN on various matters on an ad hoc basis.

There is one area of peace building strategies where a real gap exists in the Asia Pacific region. In the field of human rights, there is no systematic link between the UN's role through its human rights programs and multilateral cooperation at the regional level, whether that is by UN bodies with a regional presence such as ESCAP or through regional bodies such as ASEAN or the SPF. A factor in this may be that many of the countries of the region have not been closely engaged until recently by this aspect of the UN's work; the relatively low rate of accession to the principal UN human rights conventions and treaties is an indication of this. Probably the major reason, however, is that there is no regional machinery for considering human rights issues among regional countries. We believe it is important to develop a regional human rights arrangement which would complement the UN machinery and national institutions set up in a number of countries in the region for the promotion and protection of human rights. Networking between national human rights commissions in region will hopefully lead to the establishment of a regional human rights body.

We have already seen the effect of regional initiatives in **peace maintenance strategies**

through the South China Sea Workshop series first proposed by Indonesia in 1990. As an adjunct to this process, in 1992 ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministers' Meeting (AMM) in Manila issued a Declaration on the South China Sea, representing ASEAN's first post-Cold War attempt at applying preventive diplomacy to a security issue using existing regional mechanisms (the AMM) and instruments (the Bali Treaty).

I have put elsewhere specific proposals for strengthening the UN in the field of effective dispute resolution including the creation of regionally-focused UN preventive diplomacy units. Because preventive diplomacy is so cost-effective, a large increase in the UN's capability could be achieved at minimal cost. The creation of, say, six regional preventive diplomacy centres, including one in the Asia Pacific region, with a total staff of one hundred and the necessary support funding, would cost little more than US$20 million a year. By comparison, the UN's peace keeping budget for 1994 was $3.7 billion (and the cost of its operation in Mozambique alone being over $1 million a day). And to really make the point, it's worth recalling that the cost to the UN coalition of fighting the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein was fully $70 billion.

When it comes to <u>peace restoration strategies</u> - that is, post-conflict action - ASEAN's role in the Cambodian conflict demonstrates convincingly that regional organisations can play an important role. ASEAN, however, was not able to force a solution because it did not have the power or influence to redefine the goals and interests of the combatants or their backers, or to alter the underlying capabilities and dynamics of the situation. The United Nations was the only body capable of overcoming the key problems of power sharing. The decision of the five permanent members of the Security Council to work to end the conflict made it possible to agree on a framework for a political settlement.

Restoring peace presents significant challenges for regional organisations. If they are to increase their capacity in this area, they will have to address questions including cost, mandate and authority, aversion to military responses and the difficulty of being accepted as an objective neutral actor. The fact that the UN can levy assessed contributions towards peace keeping costs, and has the demonstrated ability to assemble multinational peace keeping forces, is itself sufficient reason to expect that, for the time being, regional organisations will continue to look largely to the UN to organise most peace keeping forces. However, while the UN will remain the primary agency for the functions of peacekeeping, peace making and preventive diplomacy, the role of regional organisations will remain both complementary and cooperative. After all, there has never been any suggestion that regional organisations should compete with or replace the UN in dealing with international peace and security issues.

Challenges to regional organisations even more obvious in the area of <u>peace enforcement strategies.</u> The enforcement provisions in Chapter VII of the UN Charter are in some ways at the heart of the reason for the UN's existence. A capacity to respond decisively and effectively, with military force if necessary, to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace

and acts of aggression" is exactly what one would have expected the UN founders to emphasise, coming together as they did after the second world war. Enforcement strategies are, of course, measures of last resort as they are intrusive and override the principle of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states.

But there is one area of peace enforcement strategies where regional organisations can play a clear and constructive role, and that is in helping with UN sanctions. That is not to downplay the difficulties. Regional bodies, by their very nature, lack the mandate and ability to command universal compliance with sanctions. We need look no further for evidence of this than the difficulties regional organisations experienced in enforcing sanctions against South Africa, particularly those member countries whose economic welfare was closely linked to South Africa's. But, at the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that many UN sanction regimes have followed on from measures taken by regional organisations. When regional organisations take a leading role in conflict resolution, UN sanctions have been coordinated with the efforts of those regional organisations in order to maximise effectiveness. Sanctions can play an important role in a graduated response to threats to international peace and security and should where possible be coordinated in consultation with the relevant regional organisation. And regional organisations can also, of course, play an important role in monitoring sanctions violations.

The need for structural change in the UN

If regional organisations are to play an increasingly important part in the multilateral security framework, if perhaps more at the peace building end of the hierarchy of international response to potential crises, structural changes to the United Nations will be needed. An increased role for regional organisations in the United Nations system will be dependent on the UN being perceived as a relevant, responsive and equitable organisation.

First and foremost, and very much to the fore of discussion about the reform of the UN, is the structure of the Security Council. Effective and constructive involvement of regional organisations in the cooperative security process - and, indeed, in the whole UN system - will depend partly on how successful current attempts will be at regenerating the UN Security Council by making its structure more representative of 1990s - not 1940s - realities. The Security Council will continue to be the UN body with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, with all the power and responsibility this entails. To be effective, the Security Council must maintain broad international support for its the decisions.

But the composition of the Security Council no longer represents the international community, as it was designed to do in 1945. Economic power, in particular, has spread to new parts of the globe, just as the realities of political power have changed dramatically

over the last half century. The principle of limited expansion of the Security Council - from its present fifteen to twenty, or a maximum of twenty five - is now generally accepted, but questions of "who and how many" remain the subject of intensive negotiation. Australia believes there should be new permanent members, including Japan and Germany (which combined now pay 23 per cent of the UN budget), but also from the major developing countries. To guarantee the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Security Council, there must be adequate representation from all regions - including the Asia Pacific - to ensure adequate airing of regional perspectives on international issues. There are a number of legitimate contenders for membership of an expanded Security Council, including from our own region. And a more widely representative Security Council would go a long way towards breaking down suspicions that the UN is a world body dominated by First World Powers. Concerns about the erosion of traditional concepts of sovereignty could be more readily allayed if the Council was more representative.

As well, a hard look needs to be taken at the UN Secretariat with a view to creating a more modern and efficient structure and administrative system. This should include a basic change to the senior decision-making structure of UN Headquarters in New York to ensure that the Secretary-General has an effective chain of command to exercise authority over the whole range of major UN operations, not just in the peace and security area. Restructuring is needed to consolidate and coordinate the more than forty separate Departments, agencies, instrumentalities and commissions which current report directly to the Secretary-General. I believe there is a strong case for creating a new working collegiate executive of four Deputy Secretary-Generals to work with the Secretary General - responsible respectively for Economic and Social Affairs, Peace and Security Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs and Administration and Management. The UN, not only in its headquarters in New York, Geneva and Vienna, but also in its regional commissions, programs and funds, will also need to develop highly skilled secretariats with a greater capacity to meet member states' aspirations for concrete assistance across the range of UN activities. And I would like to see more utilisation of regional organisations in various functional areas, particularly those involving social and economic affairs.

Conclusion

Compared with the horrors that are perpetuated daily in other regions - notably Eastern Europe and Africa, we are fortunate to find ourselves living in a comparatively benign region. But appreciation of our good fortune should not lead to complacency nor lead us to forget those areas where potentially severe problems remain - Bougainville, East Timor, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula. There is a real need to promote more effective multilateral responses to actual and potential problems, at the global, regional and country levels. Regional organisations in the Asia Pacific have developed considerably since the end of the Cold War, and their relationship with the United Nations has strengthened. Regional organisations that have been most successful in promoting security through social, economic and political growth in their regions have tended to be

those offering a series of practical and positive inducements to cooperation. The impetus may be the expectation of economic benefits, as was originally the case with the European Union (EU), a desire to be part of a broader political framework for defence and security purposes, or a response to small size or lack of particular resources. The functional relationships that have developed in the EU, ASEAN, the South Pacific Forum, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Andean Group , the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and now APEC are good examples of effective socio-economic and political peace building through regional organisations.

In the military sphere, the new commitment to the pursuit of cooperative security in Europe (especially through the OSCE), and increasingly in recent years in the Latin American and Asia Pacific regions, are good examples of peace building with a clear security focus. The very fact of the recently-established ARF, for example, and the practical range of specific confidence-building measures which have started to emerge from it, have served to create a greater sense of security and confidence among the nations involved. The pursuit of security through cooperation with, rather than against, others is the great strength of these processes. Positive developments in the security area have, moreover, been matched by rapid and sustained economic growth: both trends reinforce each other.

In the Asia Pacific region, UN and regional bodies are already well intermeshed in many areas, but with key gaps, notably in the areas of human rights and preventive approaches. But, as I have noted, there are very real comparative advantages in the involvement of regional organisations, especially in the non-military, non-coercive areas of peace building. State and non-state actors in different geographical areas should be encouraged to look beyond purely national concerns and work for the gradual development of broad, regional agendas for economic and social growth, mutually reinforcing confidence-building measures and mechanisms for the non-violent resolution of conflict: contrast the inconceivability of armed conflict among the member states of the European Union with the conflict and instability which has marked the collapse of an arbitrary and oppressive regional arrangement in Eastern Europe.

Robust, effective regional economic and political institutions will become in turn important building blocks in the evolution of effective global institutions - just as it has always been the case that the widespread existence of well governed, prosperous and peaceably-inclined individual states is the necessary underpinning for good global governance.

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