Defending nation’s sovereignty is not the act of an ‘appeaser’

Published in The Australian, 24 September 2024

Could the Alexander Downer who accuses me and Paul Keating of appeasement possibly be the same Alexander Downer who recently wrote in this newspaper that if he had a vote in the US Presidential election it would be for Donald Trump? That same Donald Trump whose willingness to accommodate Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine makes Chamberlain’s behaviour in Munich in 1939 seem almost Churchillian.

And could this Downer who now tells us that the West is facing “an existential threat from the alliance of Russia, Iran and China” possibly be the same Downer whose enthusiastic embrace of George W. Bush’s fanciful “axis of evil” (Iran, Iraq and North Korea) led us to blindly follow the US in its invasion of Iraq in 2003, with consequences resonating catastrophically ever since?

I would normally ignore being offensively lectured to and misrepresented by a former foreign minister whose only memorable achievement in nearly 12 years in that office was longevity, but his latest contribution is so wrong-headed and at odds with Australia’s national interests as to demand a response.

It is not appeasement to demand that those who beat the drums of war justify their fearmongering with more than rhetoric. And it is not appeasement to believe that Australia’s national interests – as for others in our region trying to navigate a course between the US and China – lie in maintaining close and mutually beneficial relations with both the neighbourhood giants, not becoming either’s patsy, and working diplomatically to encourage détente between them.

As I have repeatedly acknowledged in public, there are legitimate grounds for concern about China’s recent international behaviour. They include its international law-defying territorial ambition in, and militarisation of, the South China Sea. And its repeatedly stated determination to unify Taiwan with the mainland – not excluding the use of force – in a context where its repressive actions in Hong Kong have made reunification on a "one country, two systems" basis a nonstarter.

Add to this China’s continued assertiveness on other territorial fronts with Japan and India, and its efforts to increase its presence and influence over smaller but strategically significant regional players, including Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste. And its transition from a bystander to a regular spoiler role in the UN Security Council and other multilateral contexts. And, above all, the very significant expansion and modernisation of its military, including nuclear, capability.

But none of this suggests China is hellbent on territorial conquest in South East Asia, the Pacific or anywhere else, of the kind there was huge reason to fear in the past with the rise of Hitler’s Germany, and now with Putin’s irredentism in Europe. Taiwan is a flourishing democracy which we should be appalled to see crushed by force, but it must be recognised as a special case, not being recognised by any significant country as a separate sovereign entity like Ukraine or Kuwait.

While China’s behaviour certainly justifies push-back – and I, for one, don’t doubt the utility of the Quad’s messaging in this respect – much of it is no more than can and should be expected of a rapidly economically rising, hugely trade-dependent regional superpower, which is wanting to claim its own strategic space, and to generally reassert some of its historical greatness after more than a century of wounded national pride.

It is not unreasonable to think that much of China’s assertiveness would be significantly moderated were the US to step back from demanding recognition of America’s continued primacy, with Washington now seeing just about every arena as a zero-sum struggle for dominance.

While it’s the case that any country’s defence preparedness, and its deterrent armoury, should be premised on potential adversaries’ capability – not on their presumed intent – it makes no sense to talk up the potential threat posed to us by China, let alone take steps which make some kind of military action against Australia more rather than less likely. Not only has there never been any suggestion of China having designs on our territory – nor any conceivable advantage for China in severing its trade ties with us – but physical invasion has always been wildly implausible logistically, and will remain so.

What does pose a risk to us is a major war erupting between the US and China – certainly not inconceivable over Taiwan — and Australia joining in on the US side, under irresistible pressure from Washington and out of a misplaced sense of optimism that we’ll be buying lifetime insurance protection from our great and powerful ally.

Quite apart from the prospect of massive strikes on the increasing number of major US military installations on Australian soil, putting Western Australia and the Northern Territory at particular risk, the economic impact of severing overnight all links with our major trading partner would obviously be catastrophic.

What most worries Keating and me about the wildly expensive AUKUS submarine project – quite apart from the very real question of its defence cost-benefit if it is ever actually delivered – is the abdication of sovereign agency it necessarily involves, and which Downer frankly admits. For all practical purposes, American pressure for us to join it in any military adventure in which it chooses to engage in our region is already irresistible.

And that should be a matter for shame, not pride or self-congratulation, for anyone who genuinely has Australian national interests at heart.

Gareth Evans was Australia’s foreign minister from 1988-96 and president of the International Crisis Group from 2000-09.

This article was first published in The Australian on 24 September 2024.