Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

‘The Tenth Anniversary of the Seoul Defense Dialogue: Achievements and Prospects of Multilateralism’, in Conversation with Dr Moon Chung-in, Chairman of the Sejong Institute and the former Special Adviser on National Security and Foreign Affairs to the ROK President. Seoul Defense Dialogue 2021, 9 September 2021 (Online)

Presentation Summary

A number of significant multilateral dialogue forums take place every year around the region with a wholly, or very largely, geopolitical and security focus. Track I dialogue forums are those at purely governmental level, involving ministers or senior officials or both: the major ones are the East Asia Summit (since 2005) at leader level, the ASEAN Regional Forum (since 1994) at ministerial level, and other annual ASEAN hosted meetings, especially the ADMM-Plus involving defence ministers. Track 1.5 dialogue forums – those involving a mix of senior government figures together with non-government experts – are primarily the Shangri-la Dialogue (since 2002) in Singapore, the Xiangshan Forum (since 2006) in Beijing, and this Seoul Defence Dialogue (founded in 2012). Track 2 dialogue forums are those involving primarily non-government participants – think-tanks, academics, former high-level officials, NGOs and sometimes business representatives – though (as at the ROK’s Jeju Forum) senior current government figures may often be involved in giving keynote speeches or panel presentations.

Despite the different composition of these forums, they have some basic aspirations in common. Substantively, they aim to make a significant contribution to policymaking: providing a vehicle for identifying and analysing security problems – current, emerging or potential - of wider than just internal national interest; for articulating different national positions and perspectives; and for finding possible common ground on solutions. In process terms, multilateral dialogue forums aim through direct contact – particularly if repeated over time -- to build mutual personal trust and confidence among their participants.

The impact of these forums, it is quite hard to measure in terms of specific, identifiable policy outcomes. The potential impact is obviously greatest for forums conducted at head of government and high ministerial level, but these are often in practice disappointing: too often less about substance than photo-opportunities, with ‘dialogue’ involving little more than tedious set-piece speeches endorsing pre-cooked lowest-common-denominator communiqués. More robust and meaningful exchanges often take place at less exalted levels – with the Track 1.5 dialogues often helping identify new agendas, and at least clarifying the scale of problems if not necessarily contributing to solutions and Track 2 dialogues often producing analyses and policy ideas which have fed productively into higher level policy-making.

The yardstick against which the SDD should arguably strive to measure itself is the Shangri-la Dialogue, which has been operating for a decade longer than the SDD, and has been very effective in promoting itself as the ‘premier’ security dialogue forum in the Asia Pacific, not only because of the high-level ministerial participation but the sharp-edged quality of many of its debates. The SDD has done an excellent job in establishing itself, in the less than a decade since its establishment, as a key Track 1.5 security dialogue forum, with strong governmental participation at vice-ministerial level, and with North East Asia as its primary, though of course not only, focus. The growth in participation – at least until Covid played havoc with all our meeting plans – has been dramatic this is indeed a forum that key policymaking players want to attend.

It may be difficult for the SDD, hosted by the Ministry of National Defence, to achieve some of the less diplomatically formal atmosphere of Shangri-la (which is hosted by the global think-tank IISS) but the effort should be made. Dialogue forums are always most informative and stimulating when the emphasis is as much on serious and extended interaction between participants as on set-piece presentations; when session topics clearly focus on issues on which opinion is clearly divided, or which are either new or little-explored and when keynote speakers and panelists are encouraged to be clear and articulate about issues of difficulty.

In the present volatile regional environment, multilateral security dialogue forums seem unlikely to generate any momentum any time soon for the establishment of formal collective defence arrangements (like NATO) or more loosely defined, but still partly militarily focused, collective security arrangements. Given that the present environment, while troubling, has certainly not yet deteriorated to the point where military aggression is seen as seriously likely, yet alone inevitable, it may be more productive – in talking about multilateral action – to spend less time focusing on military responses arrangements, and much more time on the concept of cooperative security, which if properly understood and applied has the capacity to ensure that the need for military responses will never arise.

‘Cooperative security’ is essentially a distillation of three reasonably familiar concepts. It draws partly on the idea of ‘collective security, where participating states accept in general terms that the security of each is the concern of all, and commit to a collective response – potentially, but not necessarily, military in character – in response to threats to or breaches of international peace and security; partly on the 1982 Palme Commission’s concept of ‘common security’, that a state’s security is best achieved with others, not against them; and partly on the idea of ‘comprehensive security’, that security is multidimensional in character, with many economic and social as well as hard-edged traditional security elements. It stresses, above all, the value of creating ‘habits of dialogue’ on a multilateral basis. And the Seoul Defence Dialogue is particularly well placed to advance just that objective.

In the context of US-China strategic rivalry, while many areas of difference are currently intractable, there are still significant opportunities for multilateral security cooperation on those transnational public goods issues which Kofi Annan used to describe as ‘problems without passports’, above all, the three great existential risks to life on this planet as we know it – climate change, pandemics and nuclear war. These are also the kind of issues where middle powers like Australia and Korea have, through creative and energetic coalition-building, often made a difference in the past, both globally and regionally, and can again. If we want a safer, saner and more prosperous world, the future lies not in not ever more stridently confrontational nationalism, but in cooperative and collaborative internationalism. And in that enterprise sophisticated multilateral security dialogue forums like the Seoul Defense Dialogue again have a crucial role to play.

Gareth Evans Notes for Discussion

1. What is the current state of play with regard to multilateral security cooperation dialogue in the Asia Pacific region? What kind of forums are there and which of them has most impact?

There are a number of significant multilateral dialogue forums taking place every year around the region with a wholly, or very largely, geopolitical and security focus. They fall into three broad categories:

• Track I dialogue forums – those taking place at a purely governmental level, involving ministers or senior officials or both. The major ones are the East Asia Summit (since 2005) at leader level, the ASEAN Regional Forum (since 1994) at ministerial level, and other annual ASEAN-plus meetings, especially the ADMM-Plus involving defence ministers. The annual APEC leaders meetings (since 1993) are formally devoted only to economic issues, excluding security ones - but important geopolitical issues have often been discussed in the margins of these meetings (most notably in New Zealand in 1999, when Indonesia was persuaded to allow external military intervention to calm the then explosive situation in East Timor)
• Track 1.5 dialogue forums – those involving a mix of senior government figures together with non-government experts. The most long-established and best known of them is the Shangri-la Dialogue (since 2002) in Singapore, but this is also where the Xiangshan Forum (since 2006), clearly designed specifically by Beijing to rival Shangri-la, fits in as does this Seoul Defence Dialogue (founded in 2012) fits in.
• Track 2 dialogue forums are those involving primarily non-government participants – think-tanks, academics, former high-level officials, NGOs and sometimes business representatives – though senior current government figures may often be involved in giving keynote speeches or panel presentations. The ROK’s Jeju Forum (since 2011) is probably best described currently in this category. Others with some traction but less visible in recent years have been the Malaysia-hosted Asia Pacific Roundtable (founded in 1996) and the Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (founded in 2011). Probably most influential behind the scenes, and operating for the longest period, since 1993, has been the CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) bringing together security focused academics and thinktanks in meetings and associated study groups.

Despite the different composition of these forums, they have some basic aspirations in common:

• Substantively, they aim to make a significant contribution to policymaking: providing a vehicle for identifying and analysing security problems – current, emerging or potential - of wider than just internal national interest; for articulating different national positions and perspectives; and for finding possible common ground on solutions.
• In process terms, multilateral dialogue forums aim through direct contact – particularly if repeated over time -- to build mutual trust and confidence among their participants, on the principle that personal relationships are very often the lubricant on which international, as well as domestic, policymaking depends.

The impact of these forums, it is quite hard to measure in terms of specific, identifiable policy outcomes: the agreement with Indonesia on East Timor in the margins of the 1999 APEC meeting is the exception rather than the rule.

• The potential impact is obviously greatest for forums conducted at head of government level, Leaders usually have more authority than other ministers, or officials to make decisions and commit resources on the spot, and peer group pressure, combined with the sense of big occasion, has the potential to be quite effective in making that happen. But it doesn’t necessarily follow: very-high level multilateral meetings are too often less about substance than photo-opportunities, with ‘dialogue’ involving little more than tedious set-piece speeches endorsing pre-cooked lowest-common-denominator communiqués.
• Ministerial-level meetings are often no less disappointing, with the ARF (which I was closely involved as Foreign Minister in helping found in 1994) being a clear example. The forum was intended to evolve through three phases over time – starting with confidence-building measures, and moving from there to a more explicit focus on conflict prevention, and ultimately to conflict management and resolution. Some useful work was done on initiating discussion of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea and developing cooperative disaster relief capability, and there has been some useful continuing dialogue on issues like counter-terrorism and transnational crime, ARF is still effectively stuck in the first groove, and its role has become increasingly marginal.
• More robust and meaningful exchanges often take place at less exalted levels – with the Track 1.5 dialogues often helping identify new agendas, and at least clarifying the scale of problems if not necessarily contributing to solutions (as with some of the high-profile exchanges between senior US and Chinese officials at Shangri-la), and Track 2 dialogues often producing analyses and policy ideas which have fed productively into higher level policy-making (as with the CSCAP contributions to thinking on regional security architecture)
• Ultimately, the most meaningful measure of the utility, and impact, of a particular security dialogue forum is whether participants really want to attend it, and to repeat the experience – because of the information they glean, the intellectual stimulation they get from the exchange of ideas, and (at least when meetings are held physically and not just online) the personal relationships they develop or consolidate. It may be that familiarity does indeed sometimes breed contempt – but more often it is a precondition for more informed, empathetic and ultimately successful international policymaking.

2. How would you compare the Shangri La Dialogue with the Seoul Defence Dialogue? How can the SDD best contribute in the future to enhancing multilateral security dialogue?

The SDD has done an excellent job in establishing itself, in the less than a decade since its establishment, as a key Track 1.5 security dialogue forum, hosted by the ROK Ministry of National Defense with strong governmental participation at vice-ministerial level, and with North East Asia as its primary, though of course not only, focus. The growth in participation – at least until Covid played havoc with all our meeting plans – speaks for itself, with the first meeting in 2012 bringing together 100 people from 15 countries, and that in 2018 attended by 600 from 48 countries: this is indeed a forum that key policymaking players want to attend. The reports of meetings that I have read indicate wide-ranging and informative discussions on many different themes, but as always it is difficult to know how much influence they may have had on government decision-making: Chung-in Moon will be in a much better position than me to judge that, at least so far as South Korea itself is concerned.

The Shangri-la Dialogue, a decade older and modelled directly on the Munich Security Conference – long extremely influential on Euro-Atlantic strategic issues – has been operating for a decade longer than the SDD, and has been very effective in promoting itself as the ‘premier’ security dialogue forum in the Asia Pacific. It is hard to contest that description given its large-scale and very high level attendance – built around defence ministers – and the international attention generated by many of its exchanges, notably between US and Chinese Defence Secretaries, most recently when the forum last met before Covid in 2019. That has led to some commentary suggesting that ‘the summit attracts attention more for the grievances being aired than for any solutions achieved’, but it can’t be denied that Shangri-la Dialogue regularly makes a significant impact, and is regarded as a must-attend event by the region’s key players.

One of the factors contributing to the sharp focus and liveliness of most Shangri-la sessions is that the Dialogue was initiated, and is still organised, by a global non-governmental think-tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which as its website says, enables it to create a ‘discursive space’ which enables ministers ‘to discuss security problems considered too sensitive for more formal policymaking forums’, which ‘retains all of the political legitimacy and authority of a formal process without the usual constraints of Asian diplomatic norms’.

It may be that the SDD – hosted as it is by the Ministry of National Defence – will find it more difficult to escape some of that formality, but my personal view is that it should certainly try. Dialogue forums are always most informative and stimulating when the emphasis is as much on serious and extended interaction between participants as on set-piece presentations; when session topics clearly focus on issues on which opinion is clearly divided (e.g, Chinese geopolitical ambitions and the US response to them, or how to deal with North Korea), or which are either new or little-explored (e.g. going to the impact of new technology on security policy); and when keynote speakers and panelists are encouraged to be clear and articulate about issues of difficulty – while of course, hopefully, not just articulating grievances but offering constructive suggestions about possible solutions.

As a regular consumer of international conference sessions over many decades, my own personal criteria for success have been threefold: whether my attention was engaged throughout, whether I learned at least one new fact, and whether I came away with at least one new policy idea. Maybe that’s too high a set of bars for most forum organisers to be able to meet most of the time, but one can only live in hope…

3. Analysts draw a distinction between collective defence and collective security systems. What should we be striving hardest to achieve to ensure peace and stability in the Asia Pacific – either or both of these, or something else?

Collective defence is a multilateral arrangement between participating states, usually formalised by treaty, in which they each commit to assisting a member state if it is attacked by another outside the organization: NATO is the best known example, with its Article 5 embodying that commitment invoked for Afghanistan after 9/11.

Collective security is a broader, and looser, concept in which participating states accept in general terms that the security of each is the concern of all, and commit to a collective response – potentially, but not necessarily, military in character – in response to threats to or breaches of international peace and security. At the global level, the United Nations Charter captures that aspiration, but not completely because of the special role in decision making of particular sovereign states – the Permanent Five members of the Security Council.

In the Asia Pacific region there has never been any general collective security arrangement, nor is there any current collective defence treaty apart from the ANZUS Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States which commits its members in the event of an attack on one of them, in language which is vaguer than often appreciated, ‘to act to meet the common danger’. (That repeats the language of the SEATO Treaty, established as an anti-communist enterprise in 1954, which was dissolved in 1977 after long-standing disagreements about its application and utility.)

It is difficult to envisage any formalised multilateral collective security or defence arrangements being agreed in the foreseeable future. For those states worried – whether realistically or not – about the possibility of military aggression being initiated by China or North Korea, there is a degree of reassurance in the alliance or partnership arrangements they have with the United States. And other cooperative arrangements are emerging as more or less explicit counterweights to growing Chinese assertiveness – especially the Quad grouping joining the US with Japan, Australia and India (and about which there is increasing speculation about South Korea making a ‘Quint’), which is not yet a formal collective defence arrangement, but possibly heading in that direction if tensions grow much greater in the years ahead.

The present environment, while troubling, has certainly not yet deteriorated to the point where military aggression is seen as seriously likely, yet alone inevitable. In these circumstances my own instinct is that in talking about multilateral action - as we are focusing on in this session – it would be more productive to spend less time focusing on military responses in the form of collective defence agreements, or the military dimensions of collective security arrangements, and much more time focusing on the concept of cooperative security, which if properly understood and applied has the capacity to ensure that the need for military responses will never arise.

‘Cooperative security’ is not a totally unfamiliar concept in international relations discourse, but not as familiar as it should be. As I understand and like to use it, its foundations lie:

• partly in the concept of ‘collective security’ just discussed;
• partly in 1982 Palme Commission’s concept of ‘common security’ – that a state’s security is best achieved with others, not against them; and
• partly in the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ – that security is multidimensional in character, with many economic and social as well as hard-edged traditional security dimensions

In my 1993 book on UN reform. Cooperating for Peace – I adopted this definition:

a broad approach to security which is multi-dimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasises reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in its membership; favours multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not require the establishment of formal security institutions but does not require them either; and which, above all, stresses the value of creating ‘habits of dialogue’ on a multilateral basis.

That’s a mouthful, but the core message is in the tail: what we need to do, above all else, is create ‘habits of dialogue’ on a multilateral basis – finding ways to achieve peace with others, not against them. And the Seoul Defence Dialogue is particularly well placed to advance just that objective.

4. What opportunities are there for multilateral security cooperation in the context of the US -China strategic rivalry?

It is a time-honoured principle in international relations, as in human relations generally, that when you are in a hole a good place to start is to stop digging. That may be too much to ask of Beijing and Washington at the moment, with both sides so strongly committed to strategic competition and to denying each other what each sees as the other’s demand for primacy, certainly in East Asia if not (at least in the case of China) globally.

For China and the US, the beginning of wisdom here – which at least the Biden administration seems to be showing some signs of embracing – would be for both sides to adopt a multidimensional approach, recognizing that certain areas of disagreement will remain intractable for the foreseeable future, but that collaborative progress is possible on a number of other issues where there is actual or potential common ground.

The best prospects for such tension easing, where collaborative cooperation really should be possible if the US adopts a more measured approach and if China responds in kind, are those transnational public goods issues which Kofi Annan used to describe as ‘problems without passports’ – global and regional public goods issues like counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, piracy, international crime and, above all, the three great existential risks to life on this planet as we know it – climate change, pandemics and nuclear war.

In all of these areas (including even pandemics, if one thinks of Ebola rather than just Covid) China has in fact already played a more interested, constructive and cooperative role in the UN and elsewhere, than has been generally recognized, and is well aware of the soft power returns in being seen to do more. It is also worth noting that these issues are ones where middle powers like Australia and Korea have, through creative and energetic coalition-building, often made a difference in the past, both globally and regionally, and can again.

The overwhelming sentiment in the region is to not see the US-China relationship as a zero-sum game. No state wants to be forced into win-lose choices, and avoiding those choices themselves – or forcing others to make them – should be the guiding principle for both Beijing and Washington. If we want a safer, saner and more prosperous world, the future lies not in not ever more stridently confrontational nationalism, but in cooperative and collaborative internationalism.

And in that enterprise sophisticated multilateral security dialogue forums like the Seoul Defense Dialogue have a crucial role to play.

The recorded conversation between Gareth Evans and Moon Chung-in is available here